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The Churches of Science and Religion 
In a recent commentary on the “two cultures”, Mary Warnock and N. G. McCrum contrast 
the current debate with the course it took in C. P. Snow’s day.
1
  Forty years ago one 
commentator on the insularity of scientific culture had observed the reluctance of scientists 
to evangelise on behalf of their disciplines: according to David Waring, attempts to convert 
the non-specialist were often seen as beneath contempt. One found the “typical attitude of 
a proud and infallible church which does indeed discuss its own theology with its own 
initiates but cannot condescend to speak to the multitude”.
2
 
 
The situation has certainly changed. Lay sermons in science have become a popular genre. 
But that image of the Church scientific deserves further comment. The analogy between 
organised science and organised religion has been used by historians of science as a heuristic 
device for exposing facets of the scientific enterprise that might otherwise be missed. A 
recent example would be Margaret Wertheim’s controversial but revealing book 
Pythagoras’s Trousers, in which she reflects on a recurrent exclusion of women from science 
by a priesthood of physical scientists.
3
  As a jeu d’esprit one might point to other parallels 
between scientific and religious communities. The scientist as priest is a long established 
trope. In seventeenth-century England Robert Boyle presented himself as a “priest in the 
temple of nature”,
4
 while Isaac Newton saw himself as spiritual heir of an ancient priesthood 
which had worshipped the one true God in a heliocentric universe.
5
  The image is powerful, 
too, in popular discussions of secularization where the scientist is commonly seen as 
usurping the authority of the priest. 
 
 
Faith and Dogma 
Is there room for faith within the Church scientific?  Certainly a pervasive faith in the power 
of the technological fix, but surely also of another kind – that faith most fervently professed 
by Professor Peter Atkins, a faith in the ability of science (we probably ought to say 
scientists) not only to explain but to explain away every last shred of mystery in the 
universe.
6
  Continuing our jeu d’esprit, there is also room for dogma in the creed of scientific 
materialism. Religious institutions, when reeling from the attacks of scientific prophets, have 
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been quick to spot the dogmatism where it exists. Scientists with a strong religious affiliation 
have spotted it too. Here is the French Catholic physician Pierre Jousset, protesting in 1889 
against what he saw as the new religion of evolutionary naturalism: 
Anti-Christian science has perhaps never been more dangerous than at this moment. Rich in 
positive knowledge, it has become proud and authoritarian. The intolerance it blames on the 
Catholic Church has become its supreme law. It imposes its theories as dogmas, its hypotheses 
as incontestable truths; the dreams of imagination become articles of faith – science is 
infallible!
7
 
 
But it is not only those who might be thought to have a religious axe to grind who have 
complained about dogmatism within the promotion of science. When he attacked the notion 
of a single, privileged ‘scientific method’, so often perpetrated by apologists for science, the 
philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend insisted that  “the separation of state and church 
must be supplemented by the separation of state and science, that most recent, most 
aggressive, and most dogmatic religious institution”.
8
 A place for dogma must also mean a 
place for heresy. I have always been struck by a comment of the distinguished organic 
chemist Herbert C. Brown as he described the response he had received at a chemical 
symposium held in St. Louis in 1961. He had suggested that many of the proposed non-
classical structures for carbonium ions had weak experimental support. He had expected to 
be given a fair hearing. Instead, his suggestions were treated as a “heresy, triggering what 
appeared to be a ‘holy war’ to prove me wrong”.
9
 
 
Still other facets of the religious life might be replicated in the life of science. The scientist as 
evangelist has become a more prominent figure in recent years, partly in response to 
concerns about defective public understanding. It is not a new phenomenon. In Victorian 
England when Thomas Henry Huxley proselytised on behalf of Darwin and scientific 
naturalism he used to preach what he deliberately called “lay sermons”.
10
  One recent 
biographer speaks of Huxley as desiring a second Protestant Reformation in which cultural 
authority would pass to a new scientific meritocracy.
11
 
 
I have been describing this game of mooting parallels as a jeu d’esprit. In fact there can be 
hidden depths to the analogies. One was pointed out long ago by the Scottish evangelical 
Thomas Chalmers.  
 
Writing on popular education he held there was a “very close affinity between a taste for 
science, and a taste for sacredness”. The reason?  Both were “refined abstractions from the 
grossness of the familiar and ordinary world”. The mind that relishes either has achieved a 
“certain victory of the spiritual or the intellectual, over the animal part of our nature”. His 
conclusion was that “the two resemble in this, that they may make man a more reflective 
and less sensual being, than before”.
12
 
 
An earlier diplomat for science, Francis Bacon, saw a comparable moral depth in the fact 
that both Christianity and an experimental philosophy could prize, even generate, the virtue 
of humility. For Bacon there was hubris in any claim that one could know a priori how God 
must have made the world. To establish which of the many possible worlds that God had 
been free to make had actually been instantiated required a humbler, empirical 
methodology.
13
  The idea of experimental science as a generator or bearer of virtue was 
largely secularised during the eighteenth century but certainly not dissolved. The perpetual 
secretary of the French Academy of Sciences, Fontenelle, waxed eloquent on the virtues of 
the academicians as each one in turn was buried. Their virtues included seriousness of 
purpose, dedication, the absence of self-interest, unswerving allegiance to truth, fortitude, 
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tranquillity. One might almost say righteousness. As he constructed the scientific character, 
replete with virtue, Fontenelle declared that physics “becomes a kind of theology when it is 
pursued correctly”.
14
 
 
There is depth too in the realisation that scientific cultures commonly operate according to 
methodological conventions that may easily solidify into a worldview, having metaphysical 
as well as physical components. The distinction between Darwinism as a technical 
hypothesis about the origin of species and as a naturalistic worldview hardly needs spelling 
out. Whereas Darwin himself had refrained from speculating about the origin of the first few 
living forms, the scientific naturalism of John Tyndall demanded the rejection of what he 
construed as Darwin’s ambivalence.
15
  For Tyndall, thoroughness in science required that no 
door be left open to the intrusion of theological discourse. It is crucial to recognise that the 
slippage from a methodological to a dogmatic naturalism has occurred because of the 
powerful success of scientific methods; but nor should we be blind to the ideological freight 
that such transport has carried. Remarks to the effect that Darwinism would have to be 
defended even were significant empirical objections to arise, or that only those phenomena 
are to be taken seriously that can be measured, typify forms of metaphysical intolerance 
that recur in well known works of scientific popularisation. 
 
We might also ask whether the pressures on the scientist to be constantly innovative have 
not transformed the sciences into a kind of apocalyptic activity. The culture of research grant 
applications, for all its fecundity, encourages a discourse in which the great breakthrough is 
just around the corner. Among the less discerning this can easily lead to a devaluation of the 
past. We are always, it seems, on the brink of a brave new world. And with an investigation 
such as the human genome project, it would appear that perhaps we are. The Director of the 
National Human Genome Research Institute, Francis Collins, might even be invoked to 
underscore the question in my title. He has gone on record as saying that for him it is 
humbling and awe-inspiring to realize that we have caught the first glimpse of our own 
instruction book, previously known “only to God”.
16
 
 
 
Religious Experience and Science, Analogies and Disanalogies 
Given that explicitly religious language, and given the analogies we have just been 
rehearsing, is it far-fetched to ask whether scientific discovery can, sometimes at least, be a 
religious experience?  It is a serious question because there have been philosophers of 
religion who have analysed what Ian Ramsey called “disclosures” – those occasions when for 
the scientist the penny drops, a problem is seen in a new light, or a pattern is seen in 
previously disparate data. The language used on such occasions is sometimes revealing of a 
kind of revelation. For Ian Ramsey it enabled one to say that scientists are engaged in a 
personal “dialogue with the universe”.
17
  An elementary example would be the reaction of 
two great chemists, Dmitri Mendeleev and Lothar Meyer, who, on reading a short essay by 
Cannizzaro, saw in a moment of insight that a revival of Avogadro’s hypothesis would 
eliminate much of the confusion in the determination of atomic weights. The situation in 
chemistry was so frustrating in 1860, the year of the first international chemical congress, 
held in Karlsruhe, that no fewer than sixteen different formula were in circulation for a 
compound as simple as acetic acid. Both Mendeleev and Meyer described their experience 
as one in which scales fell from their eyes, Meyer adding that “doubts vanished, and a 
feeling of calm certainty came in their place”.
18
   
 
A richer example perhaps is provided by the modern physicist Frank Close when asked to 
describe the most thrilling moment his work had given him. His reply was the “first time an 
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experiment confirmed my theory and I felt humbled by having ‘caught Nature at it’”. Note 
the personal dialogue. He went on to say the fact that Nature already “knew” about his 
equations was an “eerie and mystical experience”. It was “an incredible surprise that quarks 
were for real!”  And so, from the interviewer came the inevitable question: “Do you believe 
in a god”. To which came the conventional reply: “not in a conventional sense”.
19
 
 
Clearly there is a fascinating question lurking here somewhere. Before exploring it further, 
we should, however, note some objections. We need to heed the disanalogies as well as the 
analogies between scientific and religious experience. The question “what counts as a 
religious experience?” is one that cannot be evaded. But there is then a problem in that 
many of the answers that have been given would seem, superficially at least, to exclude the 
category of scientific discovery. 
 
For example, in her book The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, Caroline Franks Davis 
presents a taxonomy in which the disclosure experiences I have mentioned do not obviously 
fit. She includes the sense of a spiritual presence, which would certainly be something rather 
different. The union of the mystic with a transcendent ‘other’ would again be an experience 
of a quite different kind. There might just be a tenuous analogy between the “dying to 
oneself” of the mystic and the renunciation of subjectivity in traditional ideologies of 
science; but the disanalogy again intrudes. In the one case there tends to be a renunciation 
of this world; in the other a positive embrace as a source of mental stimulus and delight. 
Under religious experience one could subsume the regenerative experiences associated with 
the language of salvation; but again this seems removed from what the scientist might 
experience in dialogue with nature. And if the focus shifts to feelings of the numinous, to a 
sense of being overpowered by a majestic holiness, this again seems not to chime with the 
scientist’s own quest for power over nature. It is under the category of numinous 
experiences that Davis refers to the Psalmist’s question:  
When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars, which thou hast 
ordained, What is man, that thou art mindful of him?
20
   
We perhaps get closer here to that sense of wonder that natural philosophers of old used to 
express; but does there not remain a striking disanalogy between the incomprehensibility at 
the heart of the religious experience and the rational quest for comprehensibility epitomised 
by the sciences? 
 
There are at least two other deterrents to assimilating a scientific insight to a religious 
experience. One concerns what Ian Ramsey called the different logics of verifiability that 
obtain in the two cases. For all the kinship between science and religion on which Ramsey 
insisted, it had to be conceded that a proposition of the form ‘God is love’ could not be 
tested in the same manner as propositions about the workings of nature. Secondly, there is 
the issue, again raised by Caroline Franks Davis, whether an experience not claimed by the 
subject as a religious experience could be said to be one by a third party.
21
  Her answer is a 
firm ‘no’ and this would preclude the ascription of a religious experience to a scientist’s 
elation if the scientist concerned did not place a religious interpretation upon it. This is an 
interesting and topical issue because Richard Dawkins has claimed that the aesthetic 
pleasure the scientist might derive from an elegant theory should not be confused with any 
form of religious sensibility.
22
  For Dawkins, any slippage from aesthetic to religious 
discourse would be a lamentable confusion. Accordingly, one would have to say that for him 
the aesthetic delight of which he eloquently writes simply cannot be a religious experience. 
But what to him would be a confusion might not be to someone who already adhered to a 
form of theism in which beauty in nature, whether mediated by scientific theory or not, 
reflected in some way the beauty of a godhead.
23
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Theological Underpinning to Science 
Here we come back to our theme because there certainly have been many scientists of 
distinction who, from within a theological framework, have conferred religious meaning on 
their scientific efforts and on such discoveries as they have made. For them the invocation of 
religious language has not been a confusion. So let us look a little more closely at the 
theological conceptions that have allowed scientific discoveries to be translated into 
religious terms. 
 
Prominent among them has been the presupposition of an ordered, intelligible world, 
derivable from belief in an intelligent Creator, the constancy of whose will is reflected in the 
uniformity of nature. It was this connection that allowed Whitehead to suggest that there 
was a sense in which modern science was a derivative (albeit unconsciously) of medieval 
theology.
24
  The formula is doubtless too neat but belief in a Creator who had made the 
world according to principles of “number, weight and measure” could certainly be given 
additional meaning through scientific analysis and discovery. In the astronomical work of 
Johannes Kepler, a Neoplatonist metaphysics was conjoined with aspects of a Lutheran 
theology to inspire an elegant geometrising of the planetary orbits. Otherwise hidden 
harmonies could be revealed by viewing the planetary system from a static sun placed at 
one focus of an ellipse.
25
 
 
When Kepler uncovered what we know as his third law of planetary motion, that which 
correlates the orbital period with the mean distance of the planet from the sun, his elation 
was expressed in language at once scientific and religious: he spoke of “unutterable rapture 
at the divine spectacle of heavenly harmony”.
26
This was not a science with religious meaning 
artificially grafted on, but the articulation of a cosmic mystery in which mathematical 
analysis played an indispensable role. 
 
Another context in which one finds what Amos Funkenstein called the seventeenth century’s 
“unprecedented fusion” of scientific and religious language was in the apprehension of a 
unity in creation.
27
  Newton would speak of the “analogy of nature”, a principle that allowed 
one to extend the range of inductive inference. For example, Newton’s theory of gravitation 
was given a universal extension beyond its initial range of application. The grounds for the 
analogical extension were at least partly theological, deriving from Newton’s affirmation of 
divine dominion and omnipresence. As he put it in one of his manuscripts,  
if there be an universal life and all space be the sensorium of a thinking being who by 
immediate presence perceives all things in it ... the laws of motion arising from life or will may 
be of universal extent.
28
 
 
Theological reflection could also provide sanction for scientific activity. The metaphor of 
God’s two books, the book of his ‘word’ and the book of his ‘works’, was frequently invoked 
for this purpose, as it was by Francis Bacon who emphasised the obligation to study both.
29
  
For Bacon the ‘Fall’ narrative in Genesis provided an additional resource. Knowledge sought 
for altruistic purposes (though not for self-gratification) when applied to the relief of man’s 
estate could help to restore the dominion over nature that had been God’s original intention 
for humankind and even pave the way for Christ’s return.
30
 
 
The claim that it was a religious duty to study the natural world can of course be read as a 
species of rhetoric designed to silence critics. Recent research has unveiled a genuine 
difficulty faced by clerical naturalists in the seventeenth century: could one justify time 
spent in studying nature’s curios when one’s primary loyalty was to one’s clerical calling?
31
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But it does not follow that the justification offered was merely window dressing. Each case 
would need to be separately examined in the light of the biography of the individual 
concerned. It is, however, clear that arguments constructed to legitimate scientific activity 
could draw on theological motifs offering religious insights into human responsibility. During 
the Enlightenment, the great taxonomist Linnaeus emphasised human uniqueness. Alone 
among God’s creatures we are able to appreciate the beauty and architecture of creation. It 
was therefore a reasonable inference that the deity had intended that his creation should be 
studied for precisely that purpose.
32
 
 
Linnaeus’s work in taxonomy introduces a further link with theology in that one could read 
into the Genesis text a divine injunction to name, order and classify God’s creatures. 
Linnaeus did it rather well and became known as a second Adam. The relish (and 
responsibility) he brought to the task is not a thing of the past. When John Rodwell delivered 
the Alister Hardy Memorial Lecture in November 1998 he communicated a sense of joy in 
the immense labour he had undertaken in cataloguing plant species and determining their 
frequency in Britain and Europe. Professor Rodwell’s scientific analysis has been geared to 
an understanding of the relationships between different species and the characteristics of 
climate, soil, and human impact that determine their prospects for survival. In his lecture he 
declared that,  
This task has a profound religious resonance for me. Is it really too fanciful to see what I do on 
naming as somehow recognising the gift of identity and freedom in those things which are the 
subject of my study … surrendering supremacy over them and trying to see them as God 
intends them to be seen?  For me this is a religious experience, articulating what St. Paul called 
the ‘eager longing’ … of the natural world, what I would call its yearning to be recognised as 
creation. In naming, by divine invitation, humankind makes it own struggle to sense and signify 
the world part of God’s creative purpose.
33
 
 
That phrase, seeing flora “as God intends them to be seen”, might be a cue for another 
example of an insight that can come suddenly to the naturalist – the abandoning of a 
completely anthropocentric view of creation. Such an insight came to the explorer John Muir 
in the middle of a Canadian swamp in 1864. He had chanced upon some white orchids. As 
John Hart has reported, Muir was thrilled by the experience, realising that no one else had 
seen these rare flowers. Muir reflected that there were many other facets of creation that 
no person would ever see, and concluded that nature cannot exist solely for human benefit 
and use. Most of the Earth’s creatures could be said to exist for themselves and for their 
Creator.
34
 
 
The Baconian justification for the applied sciences had been largely anthropocentric: they 
would contribute to the relief of man’s estate. Success in finding such relief could, however, 
also translate into a religious experience. Here is a modern example, which I take from an 
improbable source: a British Airways flight magazine. It contained an interview with Robert 
(now Lord) Winston, a leading specialist in women’s fertility and in vitro techniques. He was 
reflecting on what he called a moment of discovery: 
Back in 1973, there had been a general feeling that for women with the very common disease 
of damaged fallopian tubes, rather than unblock them, it would be better to transplant new 
ones. I took various approaches to this for months in a cold basement working on rabbits and 
rats and other rodents – one of the things I had to do was learn to put a rabbit to sleep. And 
then suddenly I discovered that there was a trick to this: if you wrap the artery in clingfilm 
from a sandwich wrapper you get blood flow and the organ survives. 
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It is the next sentence that I found arresting:  
I went down on my knees because I thought here we have the possibility for a complete cure 
of a very common disease which could change a thousand lives.
35
   
This is a particularly interesting example because, as he admits, his own technique was 
quickly overtaken by events. A year later the first test-tube baby was born. Scientific 
discoveries that get overtaken by events tend to get lost from the record; there may have 
been many like this, where an overwhelming sense of gratitude may bring one, if only 
metaphorically, to one’s knees. 
 
Following a taxonomy I have introduced elsewhere, it is plausible to suggest that theological 
presuppositions have also found expression in the motivation of scientific enquiry.
36
  Nature 
could be scoured for evidence of divine wisdom and foresight. Scientific knowledge could be 
prized if it appeared to bolster one’s theological position against that of adversaries. To be 
sure, exaggerated claims were often made for the argument to design, but there can be no 
doubt that it constituted a bridge between scientific and religious discourse until well into 
the nineteenth century. It is difficult now for us to recapture the worldview of a William 
Paley in whose Natural Theology (1802), the argument for design was cumulative, the eye 
proving it without the ear, the ear without the eye. But we can perhaps empathise with 
those for whom seeing a divine design for the first time could be a revelatory experience. I 
am thinking of the excitement with which Robert Boyle greeted the minutest mites revealed 
for the first time by the microscope. That life was possible at all on such a scale was more to 
be wondered at than the physics of the solar system in all its majesty.
37
 
 
The early texts of physico-theology make much of another special insight – that finely honed 
human artefacts when seen through the microscope are revealed in all their flaws, whereas 
the most mundane of God’s creatures (even the scales of a fish) can look strikingly 
beautiful.
38
   
 
This reference to beauty introduces yet another respect in which a theological predisposition 
might generate a religious experience through an encounter with nature. For the Scottish 
evangelical Hugh Miller, the study of fossil forms revealed architecture of great beauty, 
presaging that of the finest Gothic cathedrals. It was evident to Miller that the human mind 
shared with its Creator the same aesthetic sensibilities, the study of paleontology adding 
weight to the doctrine of imago Dei.
39
  Miller’s case is absorbing because his description of 
his first encounter with fossils almost suggests that the intensity of an uninterpreted novel 
experience might reorientate one’s interests. In an essay entitled ‘gropings of a working man 
in geology’ he recalled the kind of paroxysm he had felt:  
I was lost in admiration and astonishment, and found my very imagination paralysed by an 
assemblage of wonders that seemed to outrival, in the fantastic and the extravagant, even its 
wildest conceptions.
40
   
 
I do not wish to conflate a religious conversion experience with a scientific awakening. The 
example of Miller is interesting precisely because that raw experience of nature and his 
intense response actually preceded his religious conversion, which came through a different 
channel. But once his evangelical Christianity was in place, the rocks bore unequivocal 
testimony to their Creator, as New England spiders had for Jonathan Edwards. As Miller later 
put it: to the geologist every rock bears its inscription engraved in ancient hieroglyphic 
characters that tell of the Creator’s  
journeyings of old, of the laws which He gave, the tabernacles which he reared.
41
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Conversion and De-Conversion 
It has been observed by historians of science that first-hand accounts of a scientific 
awakening do sometimes use language reminiscent of a religious conversion. To regard a 
career in science as a vocation would not be unusual and this has had special meaning for 
scientists with religious convictions. An example would be Charles Coulson, noted for his 
distinction as a physical chemist in the University of Oxford and as a Methodist preacher. For 
Coulson, there was a thrill in the excitement of scientific discovery that matched the feelings 
of a religious devotee or a lover:  
whether or not he is accustomed to speak of it in public terms, there is no scientist who does 
not sometimes feel himself in the presence of something other than himself, … some power 
which he may partly understand, but to which he must confess an ultimate obedience.
42
   
Insisting on the artistic and vocational aspects of science, Coulson deemed it “of the spirit”: 
science was to be construed as an essentially religious activity. It clearly has been that for 
many practitioners in the past, even if we are more used today to hearing anti-religious 
sound bites from purveyors of a narrower understanding. The philosopher who first coined 
the word ‘scientist’, William Whewell, saw in the very possibility of scientific progress an 
argument for design – the design (however effected) of a mind having the special gift of 
access to truths through the interplay of fundamental ideas and experiment.
43
 
 
Conversion experiences within science can of course contribute to de-conversion 
experiences in religion if a religious faith has been made to depend on the particular 
scientific perspective that has just been rendered obsolete. A vivid and recurring example 
would be the description given by students of the life sciences when they first see how the 
world might look through Darwin’s eyes rather than through those of William Paley. To see, 
sometimes in a flash, that what had once been taken to be God’s creatures might rather be 
seen as nature’s products, as survivors in a long struggle that had extracted an enormous 
cost in terms of bloodshed and extinction – this, to use Darwin’s own word, was to be 
staggered. Here is just one account, from Darwin’s contemporary Alfred Newton. He is 
referring to that issue of the Journal of the Linnaean Society in which the innovative papers 
by Darwin and Wallace appeared together: 
Never shall I forget the impression it made upon me. Here was contained a perfectly simple 
solution of all the difficulties which had been troubling me for months past. I hardly know 
whether I at first felt more vexed at the solution not having occurred to me, than pleased that 
it had been found at all. … All personal feeling apart, it came to me like the direct revelation of 
a higher power; and I awoke next morning with the consciousness that there was an end of all 
the mystery in the simple phrase, ‘Natural Selection’.
44
 
 
 
The Quest 
I have been suggesting that where a scientist’s work is given additional meaning from within 
a theological framework, there can be something akin to religious experience. This is 
particularly the case if a scientific result happens to conform to some metaphysical 
expectation that is itself rooted in the theology. Kepler’s ecstasy would spring to mind again, 
as he thought God’s thoughts after him. Can one go any further than this?  Might the very 
quest for understanding in the sciences be seen as a process of discovery, the emphasis here 
falling on the process rather than discrete discoveries per se?   
 
Caroline Franks Davis observes that in popular questionnaires on religious belief, a crucial 
facet of the religious life is routinely obliterated. Those who confess to their searching for 
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spiritual meaning in their lives are assigned to an agnostic category in contrast with those 
who may have a definite church affiliation or who may say they definitely believe in the 
authority of scripture or whatever. As she points out, the dynamics of the spiritual life are 
simply lost as a consequence.
45
  And yet it is the questing spirit that perhaps bears the 
closest analogy to the scientific quest, understood as a process of enquiry rather than as a 
set of desiccated results. The point is worth raising because there have been eminent 
scientists, Einstein was one, who have seen in the processes of scientific enquiry something 
akin to the emotional facets of the religious life. The example of Coulson has already given 
us an intimation of this. Einstein earlier wrote that the emotional state that enables great 
scientific achievements to be made is  
similar to that of the religious person or the person in love.
46
   
One feature of that state could be resistance to the ugly. In a well-known quip, Einstein said 
that  
when judging a physical theory, I ask myself whether I would have made the Universe in that 
way had I been God.
47
   
 
The quest for the beautiful, the elegant, the harmonious in scientific theory itself can be one 
of the driving forces of creative work.
48
 
 
 
Conclusions 
What might be said in conclusion?  Einstein’s reference to an emotional state in the process 
of scientific discovery will seem over the top to many and I would not wish to generalise 
from that example. But, as Thomas Söderqvist has observed, in a recent study of scientific 
biography, the passions have so far been only marginally treated in science studies.
49
  
Whether scientific discovery can be said to be a religious experience is always going to 
depend on how one defines ‘religious’. But the examples I have given do support 
Söderqvist’s main contention that it is important to reflect on the  
passions of the scientist – both negative emotions, such as anguish and anxiety, despair and 
dread, embarrassment and fear, frustration and sadness, and positive emotions such as joy, 
hope and love.  
That way we shall be able to transcend the idea of the scientist as a mere ‘convenient 
indicator’ for the sociologist or social historian and instead become aware of him or her as a 
discrete embodied mind. One of Söderqvist’s own examples captures much of what I have 
been indicating, and in more vivid language. A scientist writes: 
You go through this long, hard period of filling yourself up with as much information as you 
can. You just sort of feel it all rumbling around inside you. … Then … you begin to feel a 
solution, a resolution bubbling up to your consciousness. At the same time you begin to get 
very excited, tremendously elated – pervaded by a fantastic sense of joy. … But there’s an 
aspect of terror too in these moments of creativity…being shaken out from your normal 
experience enhances your awareness of mortality…it’s like throwing up when you’re sick. 
 
Since that may not be the most appetising fare with which to conclude, let me finally draw 
out one additional corollary. I began this lecture with reference to an essay on the two 
cultures by Warnock and McCrum. In their account of the two cultures debate as they 
perceive it today, they not surprisingly refer to the permeation of the humanities by 
postmodernist precepts, spawning a kind of relativism with which many if not most 
scientists would feel uncomfortable if it were applied to their own work. I was once at a 
conference where Lewis Wolpert, then Chair of COPUS, the Committee for the Public 
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Understanding of Science, was thrown into an obviously emotional state as soon as the word 
‘postmodern’ was mentioned. It was, he said, not a word to be even mentioned in his 
company. But to move on an inch: Warnock and McCrum refer to some explanations that 
might be given for the new “rampant relativism”. These include the proposal from Anthony 
Quinton that  
perhaps the denial of objective truth, of real knowledge and a real world to be known, may be 
a delayed reaction to the diminution of literal religious belief, for even in the Age of 
Enlightenment God was widely thought to guarantee the orderliness and intelligibility of the 
world.
50
 
This is an intriguing conjecture. To test it would require another lecture – many in fact. But 
there would, I think, be some support from the history of science. In early modern Europe, 
Copernicus was instrumental in turning what had been a largely instrumentalist science, 
mathematical astronomy, into a new discipline, a physical astronomy that purported to 
describe the cosmos as it really is. Kepler and Newton completed the process. All three saw 
themselves as revealing a divine harmony in nature that testified to the reality of the 
structures they were describing and to the robustness of the claims for knowledge that they 
were making. In a more recent period Werner Heisenberg spoke of the humility in which one 
had to accept the gift of “an incredible degree of simplicity” in the mathematical 
abstractions of physical theory. These beautiful interrelationships could not be invented: in 
his words  
they have been there since the creation of the world.
51
   
 
That confidence in the very possibility of scientific discovery was once again associated with 
a religious reference. Heisenberg’s wife records that he had once said to her:  
I was lucky enough to look over the good Lord’s shoulder while he was at work.
52
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